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A NOTE ON SOURCES
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Panzertruppe Hermann Balck's Ordnung im Chaos , from which I have taken my
title, presents his experiences as a soldier from a historically interesting viewpoint
with a cunning wit that makes the autobiography very readable. It would be
worthwhile for this valuable work to be translated into English. For those who
read German, I recommend it highly.
The war records, which were the backbone of my research, were taken from
Germany at the end of the war and were photofilmed by the U.S. National
Archives. Since then, the originals have been returned to the Federal Republic.
Many of the documents are written records of radio messages, copied down by the
radio operator as he received the call. They are often written in the old German
script which, combined with the field conditions near Stalingrad in the winter of
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The U.S.Army's AirLand battle doctrine firmly establishes maneuver theory
as the basis of how we fight. This combat style makes use of the mobility afforded
by our weapons systems and demands flexibility in their employment, within a
framework of effective command and control. 1 The German Army of the Third
Reich fought in this manner. Germany's great military successes were due neither
to superiority in technology nor overpowering advantage in number of soldiers or
weapons. The disastrous results of attrition warfare on the western front in the
previous war, coupled with the new mobility afforded the battlefield through the
introduction of motorized machines that were unhindered by the machine gun or
barbed wire, led the German Army (hereafter "Heer") to readopt a doctrine based
on mobility. This doctrine, which has come to be labeled "Blitzkrieg", goes hand in
hand with a command and control style now referred to as "Auftragstaktik". Some
consider the German style of command and control even more important to their
superiority than the powers of organization of the German General Staff. 2
Currently the Army lacks a "coherent philosophy with regard to command and
control."3 "[Auftragstaktik] appears to be the key to the effective implementation
of manoeuvre theory as explained in FM 100-5. ..no other command technique
headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operations . 1986, 12.
2For example Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century
Warfare (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985), 29.
3Charles G. Sutten Jr, "Command and Control at the Operational Level," Parameters , vol.
XVI, no. 4, 20.
offers the speed and precision of response to match the tempo of the manoeuvre
warfare of the future."4
A study of how the Heer executed command and control should provide insight
into how this activity was done by an army that successfully employed maneuver
theory. Such a general presentation would set the stage for an in-depth analysis of
the orders and messages of a self-contained German unit—the 1 1 th Panzer Division
(under Generalmajor Hermann Balck)—during the Chir river battles in December
1942. These documents would allow a glimpse at the command and control
techniques used by a master of the German conduct of war. The Heer's experience
in Russia, especially once the strategic initiative was lost, is particularly relevant,
because it closely approximates some of the current conditions faced by NATO
forces in Central Europe. Against a numerically superior enemy, Balck's division
fought a brilliant series of "fire brigade" actions to block strong Soviet forces.
Further, the Chir river defensive battles are relatively well known among U.S.
Army officers, and General der Panzertruppe 5 Balck's brilliance as a commander
has likewise been recognized. This analysis may provide some insights towards
developing a "coherent command and control philosophy" for the U.S. Army.
4Richard E. Simpkin, "Command from the Bottom," Infantry , vol. 75, no. 2, March-April
1985, 34. Simpkin uses the term "directive control" as his translation of "Auftragstaktik".




The term, Auftragstaktik, was coined only after the last war, giving a name to a
concept that had existed in the German military for many decades. 6 Its translation
from the German is difficult; the most widely quoted equivalent is "mission-type
orders". This system of giving subordinates extensive latitude appears to have been
first introduced to Germans when Hessians fought as mercenaries for King George
III during the American Revolutionary War. The commander of the elite Hessian
Jager Corps, a Captain Ewald, published his experiences in America after his re-
turn to Germany. The tactics he described reflected his belief that "...when prop-
erly led and afforded freedom of action, soldiers acting as individuals and in small
groups consistently produced astonishingly positive results." 7 The Prussian defeat
at Jena in 1806 reinforced the need for a new approach. Ewald's concept was
picked up by the Prussians; Scharnhorst and Gneisenau continued to expand this
idea. 8 In 1860, Prince Frederick of Prussia wrote: "...an unusual desire for free-
dom from above and a desire for responsibility, unlike any other army, has de-
veloped [in the Prussian Army].... We allow. ..the ingenuity of the individual full
6John T. Nelsen II, "Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle," Parameters . Sep 87,
21.
7John M. Vermillion, "Tactical Implications of the Adoption of Auftragstaktik for Command
and Control on the AirLand Battlefield," Master's Thesis for the School of Advanced Military Stud-
ies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 December 1985,
4.
8 Ibid., 5.
measure, hold the reins more loosely, and support every success.... "9 This concept
of command and control was central in the wars of 1866 and 1870. During the
Koniggratz campaign Moltke demanded that each soldier made use of his initiative.
If a leader was unsure whether to intervene in the battle, or to follow his initial,
now conflicting orders, Moltke recommended in most cases the former, as the
opportunity for a tactical victory overshadows all other considerations. 10 The
1888 Exerzierreglement fur die Infanterie (Drill Instructions for Infantry) called
for a higher headquarters to issue orders only when necessary, to allow subordi-
nates more initiative. 11 By 1914, these methods had been absorbed to the lowest
levels of the German army. 12 The position warfare of the western front tended to
stifle the initiative of the individual, but the application of this command style bore
fruit during the Michael campaign in the spring of 1918.
Lessons from the allied employment of tanks in World War I did not go un-
heeded in Germany after 1918. This weapon offered the technical key to breaking
out of the positional warfare dictated by the machine gun and barbed wire. Heinz
Guderian took the lead in creating the modern German panzer force. While he was
able to win over his superiors to employ the great mobility afforded by tanks, the
French and British failed to realize their full potential. In his memoirs,
9Dieter Ose, "Der ' Auftrag' - Eine deutsche militarische Tradition," Europaische Wehrkunde
.
6/82, p. 264. The quotation in German: "...ein ungewfthnlicher Sinn nach Unabhangigkeit von
oben und ein auf sich nehmen der Verantwortlichkeit, wie in keiner anderen Armee, [sich] herange-
bildet zu haben.... Wir lassen...dem Ingenium des Einzelnen freien Lauf, treiben die Kunst laxer
und unterstutzen jeden Erfolg...." Translation is the author's.
10Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Deutsche Militargeschichte in sechs Banden. 1648-
1939 . Band 6, Abschnitt IX, Grundziige der militarischen Kriegsfuhrung 1648-1939 . (Munchen:
Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1983), 384.
n Ibid., 428.
12Vermillion, 5.
Generaloberst Guderian notes: "Position warfare controlled the minds [of the
French and British] despite the new panzer weapon, which to a large degree af-
forded our opponents their victory in 1918."13 Note that Germany attacked France
with about 2200 battle tanks, versus the 4800 tanks on French soil (part of which
belonged to the British Expeditionary Force). 14 These 2200 battle tanks were em-
ployed under a concept of maneuver warfare which allowed Germany to "fight
outnumbered and win". This is precisely the goal of our AirLand battle doctrine.
Auftragstaktik is a recognized concept in the Bundeswehr. However, the torch for
its application has passed to the U.S. Army. British Brigadier Richard Simpkin :
With the last of the Wehrmacht-trained officers gone, the Federal Government Army
[Bundeswehr], condemned by its government to a doctrine of positional defence,
seems to have lost the Prussian spark of creativity.... It is to the "Reformist" move-
ment in the U.S. Army that one must look for innovation. FM 100-5 Operations,
promulgating a switch from attrition theory to manoeuvre theory, is a very good
start. 15
B. THE CONCEPT
Auftragstaktik is a "broad concept. ..embracing aspects of.. .a theory of the
nature of war, character and leadership traits, tactics, command and control,
13Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen Eines Soldaten , 4th ed., (Heidelberg: Kurt Vorwinkel
Verlag, 1950), 84. The quotation in German: "Der Stellungskrieg beherrschte die Gehime trotz der
neuen Panzerwaffe, der die Gegner ihren Sieg vom Jahre 1918 groBenteils verdankten."
Translation is the author's.
14Ibid., 84. A figure of 2574 tanks for the Germans was calculated by R. H. S. Stolfi,
"Equipment for Victory in France," in History . Vol. LV, February 1970, 10. This figure also ap-
pears in Guderian, 429. Guderian claims 135 of the 2574 were "Befehlswagen" , command vehicles
which appeared to be normal tanks on the outside, complete with false wooden gun tubes, but
which were internally reconfigured for their special purpose. The widespread use of these special
command vehicles ( 5% of the tanks in the attack on France were "Befehlswagen" and thus had no
main gun) demonstrates the emphasis the Heer placed on proper command and control of its forces.
In effect, the German Army gave up 5% of its armor fire power in trade for more effective com-
mand and control on the battlefield.
15Simpkin. Race to the Swift . 18.
senior-subordinate relationships, and training and education. It. ..[is] a
comprehensive approach to warfighting." 16 The common translation of
Auftragstaktik as "mission-type orders" is unfortunate, because it focuses attention
on paragraph 2 of the operations order, whereas the focus is really on paragraphs
3a (Concept of the Operation) and 3b (Coordinating Instructions). 17 Auftragstaktik
emphasizes the commander's intent, which gives the subordinate a base from which
to make his own decisions, so that they are in harmony with the overall plan. "The
German army used mission statements...in the form of the commander's intent....
The commander then assigned tasks (Auftrdge) to subordinate units to carry out his
and his superior's intent. The subordinate commander decided upon a specific
course of action which became his resolution (Entschluss)." is
Auftragstaktik "explains basic principles of giving orders for operations." 19
Generalleutnant Heinz Gaedcke, Chief of Staff to General der Panzertruppe Balck
when he commanded Sixth Army in Hungary in 1944, and himself a Corps com-
mander in the Bundeswehr, remarked:
[Auftragstaktik] was more than a method of giving orders, actually more akin to a
habit of thought.... Usually the commander would provide only a single statement
about the operation... the job of working out the details was left wholly to the sub-
ordinate commander without supervision.... It was simply taken for granted that ev-
eryone would exercise initiative to get the mission accomplished.20
16 Nelsen, 27.
17Simpkin, 228.
18Daniel J. Hughes, "Abuses of German Military History." Military Review . Dec 86, 67-68.
19 Ibid., 67.
20Battelle Columbus Laboratories, "Translation of Taped Conversation with Lieutenant
General Heinz Gaedcke, 12 April 1979," November 1979, p 5. Hereafter referred to as "Gaedcke".
To foster this kind of individual initiative was a major goal of the soldiers' and
officers' education.
Through all of an officer's education and training, the individual's decision was hon-
ored, and if wrong, corrected without condemnation. To do otherwise would have
stilted initiative...officers who completed the military schools found it unnecessary to
receive detailed specifics from higher headquarters in orders and directives.... Their
thinking was not limited to specified doctrine or techniques but had more to do with a
professional devotion to fulfilling the commander's intentions.21
In short, the officer corps was taught how to think, not necessarily what to think.22
Generals Balck and von Mellenthin, during a wargaming session with high ranking
U.S. Army officers in 1980, stated that they "considered the individuality of the
German fighting man—his freedom to take initiative and the system which engen-
dered these policies and attributes-to be the key to superlative German perfor-
mance."23 They agreed that a higher commander rarely if ever reproached a
subordinate if he showed initiative. Much better to make a good decision now, than
to spend considerable time to find the best possible solution or, worse, to wait for
more accurate information before taking action. This attitude extended down
through the ranks, to the individual soldier. In a situation when contact with the
higher commander was lost, the subordinate could be counted on to take the action
he thought appropriate, rather than to stop and wait until contact was reestablished.
This aggressive attitude allowed units to take advantage of local successes. In short,
"...nothing laid down from above in advance is sacrosanct. A subordinate
21Richard F. Timmons, "Lessons from the Past for NATO," Parameters , vol. XIV, no. 3, 7.
22Hughes, 10.
^BDM Corporation, "Generals Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO
Military Doctrine," December 19, 1980, pp 16-17. Hereafter "Balck and von Mellenthin on
Tactics".
commander.. .is justified. ..in modifying or even changing the task assigned him" as
long as his action supports the higher commander's intent.24
C. ORDERS
Orders in combat at the division level were normally given verbally, either by
telephone or, if possible, in person. Later, when the pace had slowed down some-
what, a written copy of these orders would be prepared for the unit diary. General
der Panzertruppe Balck even went so far as to forbid the use of written orders in his
division, including his largest and most important operations orders25
,
except to
complete the diary. The more formal process for developing orders used in peace-
time would be much too slow. 26 The thorough education of the officers referred to
earlier also ensured that they all thought along the same general lines. This went
far in reducing the length of the orders, since details did not have to be mentioned.
Officers also tend to get to know each other better, the longer they work together,
especially in combat. Generalmajor von Mellenthin: "Commanders and subordi-
nates start to understand each other during war. The better they know each other,
the shorter and less detailed the orders can be."27 Von Mellenthin stated that in
Russia he and Balck usually allowed themselves only about 5 minutes in which to
decide how to deploy their division for the next battle. 28 On the Eastern Front, a
^Simpkin, "Command from the Bottom," 35.
^Battelle Columbus Laboratories, 'Translation of Taped Conversation with General Hermann
Balck, 13 April 1979," July 1979, pp 25-26.
26Gaedcke, 38.
27Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics, 22.
28 Ibid., 25.
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division often received its orders for the next day around 2200 hours. By mid-
night, the order had been analyzed, translated into regimental objectives, and dis-
patched.29
D. STAFFS
Divisional staffs were small, compared to today's standards. There were no
deputy commanders or chiefs of staff. All these positions, as well as that of opera-
tions officer, were combined in the /a30 , who was normally a captain or major of
the General Staff. 31 The other General Staff officer was the /c, responsible for in-
telligence. A divisional staff, including drivers, clerks, radio-telephone operators,
etc., came to about 50 soldiers. "The less there were, the less aggravation."32
General der Panzertruppe Otto von Knobelsdorff's staff, when he commanded the
XXXXVIIIth Panzer Corps in late 1942, consisted of a total of 12 officers.33
Germans of Wehrmacht vintage see this as essential to the proper exercise of
[Auftragstaktik]. ...an operational level headquarters should have only ten or a dozen
officers, and a minimum of supporting personnel—this meaning a minimum, not the
kind of circus that traipses around in the wake of American and British formation
commanders.34
29Timmons, 9.
30The la is the senior, or first, general staff officer (Erster Generalstabsoffizier).
31Gaedcke, 1.
32Battelle Columbus Laboratories, 'Translation of Taped Conversation with General Hermann
Balck, 13 April 1979," July 1979, p 26.
33 1984 An of War Symposium - From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations .
December 1942 - August 1943 . Transcript of Proceedings of 26-30 March 1984, (Carlisle Barracks,
PA: Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College, October 1985), 100.
^Simpkin, Race to the Swift . 261.
The commander and his key staff worked as a team; a small headquarters
helped to foster the team spirit. The decision makers were normally the comman-
der, la, and Ic. The decision process generally was quick, without much detail or
staff analysis, although the underlying staff work and planning was both competent
and detailed. 35 A system of reliefs among staff officers was not used. Instead, the
staff officers were stretched to the breaking point.36 This practice helped hold
down the size of the staff and ensured continuity. Generalleutnant Gaedcke de-
scribes his experience as a divisional la during World War II:
My division commander and I would sit together in a half-track vehicle with the map
on our laps, [and] exchange opinions. ..then we'd scribble down our instructions, give
them to the driver next to us, and he'd pass the orders along to a couple of radio
operators in the back of our vehicle.
Now [post WWII] we've built the division staff into a little city with operations cen-
ters, communications centers, and whatnot—with everything now in formal writing
and transmitted by teletype machines.
The daily command briefing-with 10 to 15 experts ranging from weather to religion-
simply didn't exist in World War II. The la (or Chief of Staff) would go with his pa-
pers to the commander, who was perhaps at his cot or his morning coffee; the verbal
report would be delivered quickly. There was no huge theater required.
There are lots of disadvantages to [today's] huge staffs. You get far too many vehi-
cles which are too hard to move and that attract the attention of enemy aircraft. The
whole apparatus becomes sluggish and slow. All of that needs to have the fat thor-
oughly trimmed away one of these days.37
These comments are not only humorous, but relevant. Generalleutnant Gaedcke
served as la and chief of staff up to the army level during World War II and later
also served as a Corps commander in the Bundeswehr.
35Timmons, 8.




The commander could not lead his forces from the rear, which included his
command post. As often as possible, he would move forward to the regimental or
even battalion lines. General der Panzertruppe Hasso-Eccard von Manteuffel:
The place of all commanders of armour up to the divisional commander is on the bat-
tlefield, and within this wherever they have the best view of the terrain and good
communications with the hard core of the tanks. I was always located where I could
see and hear what was going on "in front", that is, near the enemy, and around my-
self—namely at the focal point. Nothing and nobody can replace a personal impres-
sion.38
Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein describes how he and his chief of
staff operated:
... the Chief of Staff had to stay behind [at] the command post to deal with the work
and telephone calls, I spent the days, and often part of the nights, out on the road. I
usually left early in the morning, after receiving the dawn situation reports and issuing
any orders that were necessary, to visit divisions and forward troops. At noon I
would return to the command post for a while and then go out to visit another divi-
sion, for as often as not it is just around eventide that success beckons or a fresh im-
petus is needed.... Such flexible leadership on my part was, of course, possible only
because I was able to take a wireless vehicle along with me on these trips....39
As chief of staff to General der Panzertruppe Balck, Generalmajor von Mel-
lenthin made it a point to visit the front every two or three days, while Balck would
man the desk at the command post.40 The chief of staff would in this way have up-
to-date personal experience of conditions at the front, which was imperative, since
he often made tactical decisions.
38Simpkin, Race to the Swift . 234-235, quoting General der Panzertruppe Manteuffel.
39Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories , ed. and trans. Anthony G. Powell, with a
foreword by Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, introduction by Martin Blumenson, (Chicago: H. Regency
Co., 1958; repr., Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), 191-192.
^Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics, 22.
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The commander would often locate himself at the anticipated crux
(Schwerpunkt). Here his personal presence not only provided a boost to morale,
but allowed the most talented and experienced man to be in place to make the most
critical decision at the decisive point quickly.41 He could sense the situation for
himself rather than get it second hand.42
41 Richard E. Simpkin, "Command from the Bottom," Infantry , vol. 75, no. 2, Mar-Apr 1985,
34-37.
42Simpkin, Race to the Swift . 226.
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III. THE CHIR RIVER BATTLE
A. BACKGROUND
Operation Barbarossa burst onto the Soviet Union in the early morning hours
of 22 June 1941. The Wehrmacht had all but won the war within the first two
months, only to throw the victory away through fatal mistakes in strategic direction
at the highest level. But during the summer of 1941 enormous successes by the
Wehrmacht established " ...a psychological ascendancy over the Soviets that
continued to the end of the war. This German sense of superiority and the parallel
efficiency of German tactics and operations are fundamental for an understanding
of the German defensive successes on the Chir River later in the war."43
The Chir river is a tributary of the Don. Near their confluence the Chir river
battles occurred in December of 1942. Generaloberst Friedrich Paulus's Sixth
Army, at Stalingrad, only 25 miles east of the closest German forces along the Chir
river44
,
had been pinched off from the rest of the German forces. Seven Soviet
armies contained the Sixth Army within the pocket.45 Generalfeldmarschall von
Manstein had just been named commander-in-chief of the newly formed (27 Nov
42) Army Group Don, which included the Sixth Army, Fourth Panzer Army,
Army Detachment Hollidt, as well as allied forces in that area. The relief of Sixth
43Russel H. S. Stolfi, "The Chir River Battles," Counterattack . April 1988, 2.
^Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles; A Study of the
Employment of Armor in the Second World War, ed. L.C.F. Turner, trans. H. Betzler, (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 173.
45 Stolfi, 1.
13
Army was Manstein's foremost task.46 Fourth Panzer Army launched a drive from
the south while Army Detachment Hollidt (including Balck's 1 1th Panzer Division)
was to attack toward Stalingrad from the west. But before the attack got under
way, the Soviets struck first, attacking the Chir river positions, forcing that portion
of the relief operation to be delayed; it was never executed. The attack by units of
the Soviet 5th Tank Army along the lower Chir river fell against the XXXXVIIIth
Panzer Corps, General der Panzertruppe von Knobelsdorff commanding. The
Corps consisted of the 336th Infantry Division, the 1 1th Panzer Division, and, as of
about 9 Dec 42, the 7th Luftwaffe Field Division.47 The actions of Generalmajor
Hermann Balck's 1 1th Panzer Division, starting with the response of the division to
a Soviet attack on 7 December, will be analyzed in depth.
1. 11th Panzer Division
Formed in the autumn of 1940, the division first saw action in the
Balkans, participating in the capture of Belgrade. The division took part in Opera-
tion Barbarossa as part of Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt's Army
Group South. It fought in Byelorussia and the Ukraine for 17 months. The
division was an experienced combat unit. In the month prior to the Chir river
battles, the division had been in combat with partisans near Roslavl in Byelorussia.
On 25 November 1942, it started to move by train to Millerovo, a distance of




and road marched to its assembly area southwest of Morosovskaya, in preparation
for an attack to relieve Sixth Army at Stalingrad.48
2 Generalmajor Balck
Generalmajor Hermann Balck took command of the 1 1th Panzer Division
on 12 May 1942. Balck served as a highly decorated infantryman in World War I,
joining the cavalry in 1923. He commanded a bicycle battalion in 1935, and became
involved with the development of motorized and later Panzer units.49 Balck com-
manded the spearhead motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Panzer Division of
Generaloberst Guderian's Corps during the campaign in France, May-June 1940.
For his actions here Balck received the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.50 In the
Balkans, he participated as commander of Panzerregiment 3 51 , 2nd Panzer Divi-
sion, in Yugoslavia and Greece. Prior to his promotion to Division commander,
Balck served six months with the German Army High Command (OKH) as chief of
mobile troops. 52
^National Archives Microfilm Publication T315, Records of German Field Commands: Divi-
sions, Kriegstagebuch Nr.6 der 11. Panzer Div.Fuhrungs-Abtlg. . Einsatz RuBland . in der Zeit vom
1. 11. 1942 bis 31. 12. 1942 . roll 594. Hereafter citations from this source will appear as
"
Kriegstagebuch " followed by the date of the entry. All translations from this source are the
author's.
49Hermann Balck, General der Panzertruppe, a. D., Ordnung im Chaos: Erinnerungen 1893-
1948 . 2nd ed., Soldatenschicksale des 20. Jahrhundert als Geschichtsquelle, vol.2, ed. Dermot
Bradley, (Osnabrtick: Biblio Verlag, 1981), 677. Hereafter cited as "Balck". All translations from
this source are the author's.
50Guderian, 89-97 passim.
51This regiment was equipped with tanks, having been a cavalry unit (Reiterregiment 12) in
earlier days.
^General der Schnellen Truppen beim Oberkommando des Heeres.
15
B. 6 DECEMBER
At midnight, 5 to 6 December, the 1 1th Pz.Div. was placed under command of
the XXXXVIIIth Panzer Corps. Throughout the 6th and 7th, the division's
subordinate units arrived in the area, completing their lengthy move from the
Roslavl area. 53 Pz.Rgt.15 (the division's only tank regiment), Pz.Art.Rgt.119 (the
division's artillery regiment), and some combat support units closed on the 6th.
The division's other combat units, including two Panzer Grenadier Regiments
(Pz.G.R.l 10 and 1 1 1) and the Kradschiitzen Bataillon54 (K.61), did not arrive until
the afternoon of the 7th. 55 Commanders arrived on the 6th as part of the advance
party.
C. THE FIRST DAY - 7 DECEMBER
1. General Overview
The 336th Infantry Division was in position generally along the west bank
of the Chir, facing elements of the Soviet 5th Tank Army. South of the 336th,
Gruppe Adam, a collection of various 6th Army rear echelon units which had not
been encircled at Stalingrad, held a small bridgehead across the Chir. North of the
336th, Alarmeinheiten56 protected the division's left flank. Here the Soviets had
established positions across the Chir. On 6 December, as the XXXXVIIIth Pz.
Corps prepared the attack to relieve Stalingrad, the Soviets broke through these
53Kriegstagebuch. 6 Dec 42.
54This was a battalion of motorcycles with side cars. Most of its cycles had not survived the
severe conditions, so the battalion used trucks as transport.
55Kriegstagebuch . 6 & 7 Dec 42.
56These Alarmeinheiten were ad hoc units thrown together using rear echelon troops and sol-
diers returning from home leave.
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Alarmeinheiten and drove their 1st Tank Corps behind the German front lines to
Sovchos (state collective farm) 79. To aid the 336th, units of the 1 1th Panzer were
thrown into action as they arrived in the area.
,J&>. .'. ./Surovlkino
SOVIET
Figure 1. 1 1th Panzer Division Counterattack at Sovchos 79 7 - 8 Dec 1942
17
2. First Hand Accounts
Generalmajor Balck described these events in his autobiography,
Ordnun% im Chaos . Generalmajor Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin wrote about
the Chir river battles in Panzer Battles .
a. Oberst i. G. von Mellenthin 51
As chief of staff of the XXXXVTIIth Panzer Corps, Generalmajor (at
this time Colonel) von Mellenthin was a major orchestrator of corps actions. He
presents an interesting view of these battles. A portion of his information came
from records provided by Generalmajor Balck, as he acknowledges in Panzer
Battles . Balck himself presented the battles from a different perspective in his
autobiography. Von Mellenthin notes the following:
The 336th Division had taken up positions on the Chir by 6 December. General Balck
was reconnoitering his sector in preparation for the move on Stalingrad. ...on 7
December the Russian 1st Armored [Tank] Corps forced its way over the Chir on the
left flank of the 336th Division and swept forward to the settlement of Sowchos 79,
far in rear of our [XXXXVIIIth Pz. Corps] defensive positions on the river bank.
The units of the 1 1th Panzer Division were still making their way up from Rostov;
they were ordered to move immediately. ..and restore the situation.58
Generalmajor Balck was tasked to throw the Soviets out of Sovchos
79. He moved his headquarters along side that of the 336th Infantry Division. The
infantry wanted Balck to make a frontal attack; this decision he protested because
the terrain was unsuitable; furthermore, he wanted not simply to push the Soviets
back across the Chir, but to destroy them.59




b. Generalmajor Hermann Balck
7 Dec. Ahead of us the 336th Division, Generalmajor Walter Lucht commanding,
had arrived at the Chir and taken up positions there. As I was reconnoitering along the
Chir, I heard the bad news that the Soviets had broken through the Alarmeinheiten
and stood deep in the left flank of the 336th. I immediately drove to Verchne
Solonovski where the 336th command post was located. He [Lucht] impressed me as
calm and pleasant. I set up my command post next to his, which was contrary to doc-
trine, but which the following days proved to be superior. 60
3. Original Source Materials
These documents are principally the war diary of the Operations Section
of the 1 1th Panzer Division and the diary's various supporting documents, which
run the gamut from formal, typed operations orders, through teletype messages, to
hand written copies of radio calls.
0700 7 Dec 42 - The division commander presented his plan to his subor-
dinate commanders, followed by a ground reconnaissance by the leaders in
preparation for launching the relief action towards Stalingrad. Meanwhile, Soviet
forces had penetrated the weak blocking positions north of the 336th Infantry
Division. This development threatened the infantry's left flank. 61
0900 7 Dec 42 - Corps warning order was received at the 11th Pz.Div.
command post: "Enemy tanks from vicinity Soyevski have broken through towards
the southwest. Prepare Pz.Rgt.15 for possible counterattack."62
60Balck, 399. "7.12. Noch vor uns war am Tschir die 336. Div. unter General Lucht
eingetroffen und am Flusse eingesetzt. Als ich am Tschir erkundete, kam die Hiobsbotschaft, daB
die Russen durch die Alarmeinheiten durchgebrochen seien und in der tiefen linken Flanke der 336.
Division standen. Ich fuhr sofort nach Warchne-Solonowski, wo der Stab der 336. lag. Er machte
einen ruhigen, angenehmen Eindruck. Ich schlug meinen Gefechtsstand neben ihm auf, was zwar
gegen die Regel war, aber sich in diesen Tagen geradezu hervorragend bewahrte."
61 Kriegstagebuch . 7 Dec 42.
62Kriegstagebuch . 7 Dec 42.
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0915 7 Dec 42 - 11th Pz.Div. passed warning order to Pz.Rgt.15.
"Enemy with 50 tanks broken through left flank of 336th Inf.Div. Make regiment
ready to move immediately. Order to follow."63 The la was not at the command
post, although that was his normal location. Rather than wait for a more senior of-
ficer to take action, a first lieutenant (Oberleutnant) sent out this order.64
0925 7 Dec 42 - Corps telephonic order received by 1 1th Pz. Div.:
Enemy tanks from area vicinity Soyevski65 attacking direction
southwest with lead elements at Sovchos (state collective farm) 79.
11th Pz.Div. hastily attacks, in cooperation with 336th Inf.Div.,
with Pz.Rgt.15 from Verchne Solonovski to the north, throws enemy
back across Chir river. [This is a frontal attack].
Send liaison officer to 336th Inf.Div. immediately. Haste impera-
tive! 66
0930 7 Dec 42 - Division passed order to Pz.Rgt.15. Again, signed by our
Oberleutnant.
1 125 7 Dec 42 - A new order from Corps now called for the destruction
of the enemy units south of the Chir, as opposed to "throwing them back across
63National Archives Microfilm Publication T315, Records of German Field Commands: Divi-
sions, Kriegstagebuch Nr.6 der 1 1. Panzer Div.Fuhrungs-Abtlg. . Einsatz RuBland . Anlegband Nr.
2 v. 1.12. 1942 bis 15. 12. 1942 . roll 595, frame 29. Hereafter citations from this source will ap-
pear as
"
Krieg stagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2" followed by the frame number.
^It is possible that the command post was in radio contact with the Div. Cdr. and the la.
65The name of this town is unclear. It is given as both Ssulaszki and Ssavinski in German
documents. In any case, it appears that the small settlement near Sovchos 79, which is labeled
"Soyevski" on the accompanying maps, is being referred to.
^Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frame 30.
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Chir River," as ordered earlier. Pz.Rgt.15 is subordinated (operational control, or
OPCON) to the 336th Inf.Div. for this action. 67
Oberst Graf Schimmelmann, commanding Pz.Rgt.15, informed the Divi-
sion command post per written message (at 1235) that his 3rd Bn had started to
move at 0930. This was only 15 minutes after his regiment had received the
warning order! 68
1205 7 Dec 42 - The situation continued to deteriorate. The 336th was
unable to stop the enemy advance, even though augmented with Pz.Rgt.15. The
entire 1 1th Pz.Div. was now given the mission to stop the enemy's advance. The
remaining units of the division (Artillery, Engineer, and FLAK69 ) joined the attack
at 1300. 70
By 1700, 7 December 1942, the situation looked like this: the counter-
attack against the Soviet bridgehead was coming along nicely on the right flank. On
the left, the enemy had managed to reach Sovchos 79. His attack had stopped at
dusk. The location of friendly forward units was not entirely clear. To keep the
enemy from advancing further, streets south and southwest out of Sovchos 79 were
blocked by 1 1th Panzer Division units. 71 A new corps order was received at 1850.
It ordered the division to attack and take Sovchos 79 the following morning.
Throughout the evening, radio contact was established with the various elements of
the division. The division order for the destruction of the enemy units had been
67Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frame 33.
68Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . Frame 34.
69Air defense artillery (FLiegerAbwehrKanone)
70Kriegstagebuch . 7 Dec 42.
71 Kriegstagebuch . 7 Dec 42.
21
sent to the units of the 1 1th Panzer. Unfortunately, a copy of this order is not in the
records. It was passed along by radio, messenger (written form), and verbally,
most likely by Balck himself. The units moved into position during the night,
without being detected by the Soviets.72
4. Analysis
The 1 1th Pz.Div. was caught totally by surprise when it was ordered into
combat. Most of the combat units had not yet completed their movement from the
railhead. The commanders were planning the upcoming offensive operation
against the Soviet forces surrounding 6th Army at Stalingrad.
The Corps warning order was passed to Pz.Rgt.15 in 15 minutes. Only a
very junior officer was at the command post (CP); both the division commander
(who usually is not at the CP) and the la, who usually is, were absent. The Ober-
leutnant passed the order along immediately, and the 15th Panzer Regiment re-
sponded, without any bickering or questioning of the order of so junior an officer.
It is quite possible that radio contact between the Div. Cdr., the CP, and Pz.Rgt.15
existed, but this does not diminish the importance of the mutual trust and
"eagerness to take charge"73 demonstrated by this action.
It was not usual for a corps order to specify which of the division's units
would be employed to accomplish a given mission. In this case, however, the only
combat element available to the 1 1th Pz.Div. was Pz.Rgt.15; the other three combat
units (P.G.Rgts. 110 and 1 1 1 and K.61) were still en route from the railhead.
72Kne gstaget>uch, 7 Dec 42.
73The appropriate German term is Verantwortungsfreude, which does not translate easily into
English.
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Between 0925 and 1125, the corps order was fundamentally changed.
This corroborates von Mellenthin's description of the battle (which he based in
large part on documents provided him by Balck). Balck realized the seriousness of
the situation. He saw that the planned attack to save the Sixth Army must wait, but
he was not happy with the Corps order. He claimed that the direction of the attack
was across ground unsuitable for tanks. Further, he was not interested in just
throwing the enemy back across the Chir. If the situation was dire enough to delay
the important relief operation of Stalingrad, the goal must be to destroy the en-
emy! 74 The new Corps order (1725) reflected Balck's assessment.
Generalmajor von Mellenthin, at the 1984 Art of War Symposium,
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, pointed out: "It was a very simple order, 'to de-
stroy the enemy.' We did not say how ~ from the front or rear. That was left to
the commander to decide what he had to do. We did not care about these details."75
The first of Oberst Schimmelmann's battalions was on the move only 15
minutes after receiving the warning order. Schimmelmann himself was most likely
with the rest of the commanders at the terrain reconnaissance; the execution of this
order thus fell to a more junior officer. Without the senior officers on hand, a to-
tally unexpected emergency situation was handled fluidly. Once Balck had a chance
to study the situation in a little more detail, he chose to work with the corps head-
quarters to change the mission more to his liking. What characterized the German
style was that the word was passed quickly and units were dispatched without wait-
ing for detailed orders. Those would come in good time. This method of operation
74von Mellenthin, 177.
75 1984 Art of War Symposium . 102.
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was similar to that of a fire brigade. The immediate need was to get the fire trucks
rolling; the plan for their employment could be developed on the road.
Thirty minutes after the corps had ordered the 336th Division, in concert
with Pz.Rgt.15, to destroy the enemy tanks, the order was changed once again.
This change appeared to be a reaction by the XXXXVIIIth Pz. Corps to a decision
made by Generals Lucht and Balck. But rather than causing a great deal of confu-
sion, which such changes to orders must create, this order substantiated the decision
reached by the two division commanders. The commander's intent was to destroy
the enemy, how that was to be accomplished can be judged best by those closer to
the action.
Balck 's decision to collocate the two divisional command posts indicated
that he recognized the gravity of the situation. Only a commander with great con-
fidence in his own abilities would take such decisive action so totally contrary to
doctrine.
The division was committed into action piecemeal, something that Balck
would only do in an absolute emergency. As the other combat elements arrived
during the afternoon, they were ordered to join the attack. Little actual contact be-
tween the enemy and the 11th Pz. Div. seems to have occurred on the 7th.
Pz.Rgt.15 was the only one to report any engagement results — one KW1 destroyed
and one damaged.76 As the various units moved into position to stop the further ad-
vance of the Soviets, the enemy settled into Sovchos 79 as darkness fell on the
battlefield.
76Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frames 43-44.
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D. THE BATTLE OF SOVCHOS 79 - 8 DECEMBER
1. General Overview
While the enemy's 50 tanks slept, the various elements of the 1 1th Pz.Div.
moved into place around Sovchos 79. By morning (8 December) the division was
deployed for a concentric attack; the Soviet 1 st Tank Corps was surrounded at Sov-
chos 79. The Germans struck just as the Soviets started to move, on their way to
turn the flank of the 336th. The battle lasted 7 hours. The Soviet 1st Tank Corps
did not survive the day.
While Balck concentrated on the enemy at Sovchos 79, the Soviets
brought more, previously uncommitted forces to bear on the 336th. The situation
was deteriorating. Soviet tanks were flooding through the gap between the
Alarmeinheiten and the 336th's left flank, pressuring that weak flank. Pz.Rgt.15
had to be pulled from the Sovchos 79 battle, leaving the Panzer Grenadiers to finish
off the Russians there while the tanks came to the aid of the infantry. 77
2. First Hand Accounts
a. Generalmajor Hermann Balck
On the 8th everything is ready for the attack. It is imperative to be at the decisive point
an hour before the Russians. A rule which brought us success almost every day.
Unfortunately the situation was so critical that a proper assembly of the division was
not possible.
To protect the 336th Inf.Div., I [Balck] erected an obstacle composed of FLAK, engi-
neer, and PAK78 units. The Russian plan for the following morning [8 Dec] was
obvious: turn the 336th's flank. When the Russian formed up in the morning, we
were in place. He did not suspect our presence. [Oberst] Graf Schimmelmann, the
trusty commander of Pz.Rgt.15, struck him in the back, with [P.G.]Rgt. 1 1 1 follow-
ing, at the very moment when he[the enemy] started to move east on his attack. First a
77Kriegstagebuch . 8 Dec 42. At 0903 Pz.RgLl5 send a message to the division, stating that it
has passed the battle [at Sovchos 79] off to P.G.Rgt. Ill, and that it was moving to make contact
with the [left] flank of the 336th. CKriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frame 69).
78Anti-tank guns (PanzerAbwehrKanone)
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long convoy of motorized infantry fell prey, then the mass of the Russian tanks,
which themselves were attacking the 336th Division. Regiment 1 10 came up and I
committed it to Sovchos 79, where we spotted numerous additional Russian tanks in
the valley. These had been cut off from their support elements. One could see tanks,
trucks, and Russian soldiers, who were running about nervously.
As evening fell, the 1 st Russian Tank Corps has ceased to exist. 53 shot up Soviet
tanks were strewn across the steppe.79
3. Original Source Materials
The attack began at 0430 with P.G.Rgt.lll, followed by Pz.Rgt.15 at
0445, and P.G.Rgt.l 10 at 0520. 80 At 0625 the division la sent a radio message to
Pz.Rgt.15 informing it that 40 enemy tanks were attacking from the east. The
regiment was ordered to counterattack immediately. 81 At 0700 the tank regiment
reported sighting an enemy truck convoy to division operations. 82 As the Soviet
forces located at Sovchos 79 started moving to strike the 336th in its flank, Schim-
melmann's Pz.Rgt.15 attacked the enemy rear. The tank regiment was now heavily
79Balck, 399-401. "Am 8.12. war alles zum Angriff bereit. Es kam darauf an, eine Stunde
friiher als der Russe am entscheidenden Punkt zu sein. Eine Regel, mit der wir von nun ab fast
taglich Erfolg hatten. Leider war die Lage so kritisch, daB ich eine Versammlung der Division nicht
abwarten konnte.
Zum Schutze der 336. Div. hatte ich einen Riegel aus Flak, Pionieren und Pak eingesetzt. Was
der Russe am nachsten Morgen tat, lag auf der Hand. Aufrollen der 336. Div.. Als der Russe am
Morgen antrat, waren wir zur Stelle. Unsere Anwesenheit ahnte er nicht. Graf Schimmelmann, der
bewahrte Kdr. des Panzerregiments 15 stieB ihm - gefolgt vom Regiment 1 1 1, in dem Augenblick
in den Rucken, als er zum StoB nach Osten ansetzte. Zuerst muBte eine lange Kolonne motorisierter
Infanterie dran glauben, dann die Masse der russischen Panzer, die im Angriff auf die 336. Division
waren. Das herankommende Regiment 1 10 setzte ich auf den Sowchos 79 an, wo man weitere
zahlreiche russische Panzer im Talkessel sah, die von ihren Verbindungen abgeschnitten waren.
Man sah Panzer, LKW und nervbs hin- und herlaufende Russen.
Als sich der Abend senkte, hatte das I. russische Panzerkorps zu bestehen aufgehort. 53
Russenpanzer lagen zerschossen auf der Steppe."
80Kriegstagebuch , 8 Dec 42.
81 Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frame 54.
82Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frame 61.
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engaged with the enemy at Sovchos 79. Once the Soviets discovered that they were
surrounded at Sovchos 79, they attempted to break out in several directions. 83
Meanwhile, the enemy brought more tanks through the gap along the left
flank of the 336th Inf. Div. That front started to stagger, causing the 336th to re-
quest an immediate counterattack by Pz.Rgt.15. The third battalion of Pz.Rgt.15
was diverted to help shore up the 336th. But the Panzer battalion was out of
ammunition, having expended it all earlier in the morning, so the second battalion
took the mission. 84 At 0955 Pz.Rgt.15 reported; "Hole [the enemy had apparently
succeeded in forcing a break in the ring around Sovchos 79] as good as closed. Re-
quest immediate advance of [P.G.Rgt.] 1 10, to free tanks for attack to the south."85
Written copies of a series of radio messages between the division com-
mand post and the various subordinate commands reveals that the battle was raging
throughout most of the day. All messages were simple; a few words sufficed. Un-
characteristically, the division command post momentarily lost its composure.
Unsure of the situation along the 336th's threatened flank, it sent this query to
Pz.Rgt.15: "Situation vicinity height 161 [the threatened flank] unclear. Where
Pz.Rgt.? Answer immediately."86
83Kriegstagebuch , 8 Dec 42.
^Krie gstagebuch . 8 Dec 42.
85Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frame 80.
86Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frame 90. "Lage bei 161 hone unklar[?]. Wo Pz.Rgt.
Sofort antwort."
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By midday more logistics problems plagued the tank regiment. "Attack
proceeding eastward with half the regiment, due to lack of fuel. By the way, 20
[enemy] tanks destroyed."87
By 1425, Sovchos 79 was taken. The rest of the division's units were now
committed to reestablish the 336th Infantry Division left flank.88
In its daily summation report to the XXXXVIIIth Pz. Corps, the division
closed the report with its intentions for the following day. "Intention for 9
December—penetration to Chir. Clean up of pocket." Reference to a pocket
concerns the forces still threatening the 336th Inf. Div.'s left flank.89
A representative radio message was sent by Kradschutzen (motorcycle)
Battalion 61, which was assigned the mission of division reserve. The message was
sent at 1500, received by the division command post at 1533, and reviewed by the
la, Major Kienitz, at 1542. "Reached location as ordered. Enemy in sight. Contact
with lll[P.G.Rgt.] established."90
4. Analysis
Note here how Balck took the initiative, even though his division had been
sent into battle piecemeal. Twenty-four hours previously he had been totally sur-
prised by the Soviet attack; he was on a terrain walk with his regimental
87Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frame 93. "Angriff nach Osten und mit halbem Regt., da
Treibstoffmangel. Leidlich 20 Panzer abgeschossen."
88Kriegstagebuch . 8 Dec 42.
89Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frame 105. "Absicht 9.12. DurchstoB zum Tschir.
Saubern des Kessels."
90Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frame 106. "Befohlener Standort erreicht. Feind in
Sichl. Verbindung mit 1 1 1 hergestellt."
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commanders in preparation for the relief of Stalingrad. Now he controlled the
battle. The Soviets at Sovchos 79 were forced to react to him.
Today we would say that Balck had "moved inside the enemy's decision
cycle." These terms, and more importantly, that line of thought did not exist with
Balck. But the same result, taking the initiative from an opponent, was achieved by
aggressive, decisive action. In this desperate battle, the 1 1th Panzer Division had
to destroy the enemy to survive. Balck did this most effectively, superbly orches-
trating the tactical skills of his troops. He moved faster and hit harder than his foe.
In this way he replaced, at the tactical level, defensive with offensive, reaction with
proaction, defeat with victory. This ability to win tactical victories by taking the
initiative from the attacking enemy is what makes the study of these battles so in-
teresting and relevant today.
By being able to move and respond quickly, the tanks multiplied their
combat value on the battlefield. Once the enemy's strength at Sovchos 79 had been
broken, the battle was carried on by the mechanized infantry, allowing the tanks to
turn about and attack the next crisis point. That the tanks started to run out of am-
munition and fuel attests to the tough fighting as well as to the difficulties of logis-
tics support in battle.
Messages and orders recorded in the records are uniformly short and
precise. They provide the division command post with sufficient information to do
its job. Note that the command post did not interfere much with the conduct of the
battle, the exception on this day being the diversion of forces to aid the collapsing
left flank of the 336th Infantry Division. Otherwise, the regimental commanders
fought their battles. Although no mention is made of Balck's actions on this day, it
is safe to assume that he was located at the Schwerpunkt (crux), where he could
most effectively influence the battle. Most communications among the division's
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leaders were undoubtedly done using radio or physically, face to face. There is no
written record of these contacts, but they should have mirrored those that are
available for study-brief and to the point.
Major Kienitz, the division la, informed his higher headquarters of his
unit's intentions for the next day. Generalmajor Balck used this technique to pro-
vide the corps with what he thought was the best course of action from his view-
point. Balck describes his routine with his la:
As far as command and control goes, this is how I worked with my General Staff Of-
ficer [la]. The latter would stay in a fixed place along with the staff, a place set off a
ways from the fighting, where he maintained contact with higher and flanking units,
directed reinforcements forward, etc. I commanded up front by radio or through face-
to-face orders, where I was mobile and would position myself at the current focal
point and could move my flag quickly.91
E. THE ATROCITY AT SOVCHOS 79
Mention is made of this atrocity not so much to analyze command and control
technique as to demonstrate the gravity of the situation for the Germans. The pur-
pose is not to imply that Soviet troops should be expected to act in this manner in
the future. Atrocities occur in the forces of "civilized" as well as more "primitive"
societies.
The supply trains of the 336th Infantry Division were located at Sovchos 79
when the Red Army attacked the settlement on 7 December. When German forces
recaptured Sovchos 79 the following day, a gruesome event was discovered:
91 Balck, 381. "FuhrungsmaBig hatte ich mich mit meinem Generalstabsoffizier wie folgt
eingespielt. Letzterer blieb mit dem Stab an einem festen Platz, der etwas vom Kampfgeschehen
abgesetzt war, hielt Verbindung nach oben und mit den Seiten, dirigierte Verstarkungen usw. nach
vome. Ich fiihrte vome beweglich mit Funk oder durch personlichen Befehl, wobei ich mich stets
am jeweiligen Brennpunkt befinden und meinen Standpunkt schnell wechseln konnte."
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By the hundreds, our brave soldiers' bodies lay around, beastily murdered. At dawn
they had been surprised by the Russians and were smashed.
The situation became crystal clear. It was a matter of existence or nonexistence.
Could we protect our homeland, despite our overextended situation and the uncount-
able Russian masses? We hoped and believed that we could.92
Balck addressed his troops on this matter by issuing an order of the day, some-
thing he did only rarely. Another item mentioned in this order to his troops
concerned a statement made by a Soviet POW, a Sergeant Kurilko, of the 157th
Tank Brigade:
At a briefing shortly before the 19th of November 1942 (the Brigade was in prepara-
tion for its attack on the 3rd Rumanian Army), at which both the brigade and battalion
commanders were present, two Rumanians were presented, apparendy turncoats. The
soldiers at the briefing were told that these were Rumanians, whom it was permitted to
capture. German prisoners were not acceptable. Rumanians were not to be shot in
front of Germans; shooting Germans in front of Rumanians was all right.93
The results of this mind set was the massacre of German soldiers at Sovchos 79.
Balck closed this order of the day with these words:
Mates! The last few days of hard fighting showed once again: this is a matter of exis-
tence or nonexistence of our people. If you should lose your courage for a few hours,
if you should become weak in these bitter fights, think always of this: the Anglo-
92Balck, 401. "Zu Hunderten lagen unsere braven Leute bestialisch ermorded herum. Sie
waren im Morgengrauen von den Russen iiberrascht und zerschlagen worden.
Ein Blitzstrahl erleuchtete die Lage. Es ging urn Sein oder Nichtsein. Konnten wir angesichts
unserer uberspannten Lage und der unermeBlichen russischen Masse die Heimat schiitzen. Wir
glaubten und hofften ja."
93 Balck, 401-2. "Bei einer Versammlung kurz vor dem 19.11.1942 (Bereitstellung der
Brigade zum Angriff auf die 3. rumanische Armee), bei der Brigade- und Abt. [ Abteilung] Kom-
mandeur anwesend waren, wurden zwei Rumanen vorgefiihrt, die angeblich ubergelaufen waren.
Es wurde den versammelten Soldaten dabei erklart, dies waren Rumanen und die durfte man
gefangen nehmen. Deutsche Gefangene durften sie nicht machen. Rumanen durften sie nicht vor
den Augen der Deutschen erschieBen, wohl aber Deutsche vor den Augen der Rumanen."
This interrogation was documented by the divisional /c, who forwarded the report to the
XXXXVIIIth Pz. Korps as a matter dealing with the violation of the Geneva Convention. Balck's
citation appears to stem from this source. See Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 , frame 122.
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American eruptions of hatred, the watchwords [the above-described attitude concern-
ing German prisoners] of the 157th Russian Tank Brigade, and the gruesome
spectacle at Sovchos 79, showed us without a doubt what kind of fate was awaiting
us, should we fail to achieve victory in this battle.94
F. 9-17 DECEMBER
1. General Overview
On 10 December, Generaloberst Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army
launched its attack to relieve Sixth Army at Stalingrad. Meanwhile, the fighting
along the Chir river continued in the same general pattern established in the first
days of the battle. The 11th Panzer Division was called upon again and again to
"put out the fire" somewhere along the XXXXVIIIth Panzer Corps front.
A specific battle which is representative of the actions during this period
started the evening of 1 1 December. Word came from Corps HQ that the enemy
had broken through the front of the 336th Infantry Division, this time at both
Nizhna Kalinovski and Lissinski simultaneously. The 1 1th Pz.Div. at the time was
reducing the Soviet bridgehead at Ostrovski, which by this time was small enough
to no longer be considered an immediate threat, but which had not been completely
cleared.95 The events of the 12th of December are analyzed in detail below as rep-
resentative of this time period.
94Balck, 402. "Kameraden! Die hinter uns liegenden harten Kampftage zeigen uns von
neuem: Es geht urn Sein oder Nichtsein unseres Volkes. Wenn Ihr einmal fur Stunden den Mut
verliert, wenn Ihr in den verbitterten Kampfen einmal schwach werden solltet, denkt immer daran:
die englisch-amerikanischen HaBausbriiche, die Parolen ber 157. russ. Pz. Brigade und der
grausige Anblick der Sowchos 79 zeigen uns eindeutig, wenn wir diesen Kampf nicht siegreich
bestehen, was fur ein Schicksal unserer harrt."
For the record copy of this Tagesbefehl, see Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frames 136 &
137.
95Kriegstagebuch. 1 1 Dec 42.
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Figure 2. 1 1th Panzer Division Counterattack Along Chir River 12 Dec 1942
2. First Hand Accounts
a. Generalmajor Hermann Balck
Generalmajor Balck remembers these days as follows:
From 9 to 17 December one day was like the other. Russian breakthrough at point X-
-attack-by evening everything was cleared up. As "reward" a message of another
deep enemy breakthrough 20km due east at some Alarmeinheit . Turn around.
Tanks, infantry, and artillery drove through the winter night, headlights full on. By
dawn they stood at the Russian's most vulnerable spot, attacked with surprise,
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crushing him, only to play the same "game" the following morning, somewhere 10 or
20 km to the west or east.96
However, the losses of the division were not too high, because it always had the mo-
mentum of surprise on its side. A familiar refrain in the division during these days
was "Night marches save blood."97
It was during these days that General der Panzertruppe Hoth's Fourth
Panzer Army was scoring its early successes in its attempt to relieve the trapped
Sixth Army at Stalingrad. "The greater the enemy forces which we brought onto
ourselves, the easier would be the task of the Fourth Panzer Army. The daily anx-
ious question was 'Is the Fifth Tank Army (our opponent) still here, or has he
marched to fight Hoth?' Then when we received a message that tanks had broken
through [the XXXXVIIIth Pz. Corps' front lines], the reaction was, 'Thank God,
they are still here.'"98
Of special interest is Balck's description of the command style be-
tween himself and his second-in-command, Major Kienitz:
A unique command style had developed. The general staff officer, the brilliant Major
Kienitz, stayed in place a little ways back [at the command post] and kept in contact
with God and the world, and with me, by wireless. I was mobile and positioned my-
self at the focal point. Often I was at each regiment several times a day. Evenings,
still out on the battlefield, I would make my decisions for the following day. I
discussed my plan with Kienitz, via telephone, drove back to each regiment, and
96Balck, 403. "Vom 9.-17. Dezember verlief ein Tag wie der andere. Russeneinbruch bei X-
-Angriff-abends war alles bereinigt. Dafur Meldung 20km ostwarts weiterer defer Einbruch bei
irgendeiner AlarmeinheiL Kehrt. Aufgeblendet fuhren Panzer, Schiitzen und Artillerie durch die
Wintemacht, standen im Morgengrauen an der fur den Russen empfindlichster Stelle, fielen uber-
raschend liber ihn her, zerschlugen inn, um am nachsten Morgen dasselbe Spiel 10 oder 20 km
weiter west- oder ostlich zu wiederholen."
97Balck, 403.
98Balck, 403. "Je mehr Krafte wir auf uns zogen, um so leichter wiirde die Aufgabe der 4.
Pz. Armee. 1st die 5. Pz. Armee, unser Gegner, noch da oder zu Hoth abmaschiert, war die
tagliche bange Frage. Kam dann die Meldung: Panzerdurchbruch bei X, so war die Reaktion: Gott
sei Dank, sie sind noch hier."
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personally gave the orders for the next day. Then I returned to the command post, and
spoke on the phone with the chief of staff of the XXXXVHIth Pz. Corps, Oberst von
Mellenthin. If Knobelsdorff, the CG", agreed, the regiments would receive a short
acknowledgment: "No Changes". If changes were necessary, I would visit all the
regiments once more that night. There were no misunderstandings. By daybreak I
was back at the decisive place. 100
b. Oberst i. G. von Mellenthin
Between the 9th and the 13th, the 11th Pz.Div. was kept busy reduc-
ing Soviet bridgeheads. On 1 1 December the Panzers had to be used repeatedly to
restore the front. By evening, the enemy had broken through the line at two places:
Lissinski and Nizhna Kalinovski, 22km apart. Balck decided to go for the enemy at
Lissinski. 101 "This decision was dictated by Balck's appreciation that the front of
the 336th Division was the pivot and the shield for the operations of the 11th
Panzer, and that this front had to hold at all costs." 102 The 336th's mission of hold-
ing the line allowed the 1 1th to dash back and forth across the Corps area of opera-
tions. In this way it could achieve local superiority over the enemy. Should the
336th fail to hold back the tide of the Russian attackers, the Panzer Division would
eventually become fully committed on the line, thereby losing its operational
mobility.
"Commanding General [of the XXXXVHIth Pz. Corps]
100Balck, 403-4. "Der Generalstabsoffizier, der brillante Major Kienitz, saB ortsfest etwas
riickwarts und hielt Verbindung mit Gott und aller Welt und mit mir durch Funk. Ich war be-
weglich und war im Brennpunkt. Meist mehrmals taglich bei jedem Regiment. DrauBen faBte ich
abends den EntschluB fur den kommenden Tag. Sprach mich telefonisch mit Kienitz aus, fuhr zu
jedem Regiment und gab ihm persbnlich den Befehl fur den kommenden Tag. Fuhr zuriick.
Sprach telefonisch mit dem Chef des Stabes des XXXXVIII. Pz. Korps, Oberst von Mellenthin.
War Knobelsdorff, der K.G., einverstanden, erhielten die Regimenter den kurzen Bescheid: keine
Anderungen. Waren solche ndtig, fuhr ich nachts selber noch mal alle Regimenter ab.




3. Original Source Materials
The command post received word at 1 100, 1 1 December, that the enemy
had broken through at Nizhna Kalinovski, with infantry and tanks. The word of
the breakthrough in the 336th Inf.Div.'s line, at Lissinski, reached the CP later in
the evening. The 1 1th Pz.Div. had been fighting to reduce the Soviet bridgehead at
Ostrovski and its success there made a major enemy attack at that point impossible
for the time being. The break of the line at Lissinski was the more unpleasant of the
developments. That evening the Division commander recommended to the Com-
manding General of XXXXVIIIth Pz. Corps that primary emphasis for the attack
be placed there. The plan was agreed to, and Balck personally delivered the attack
orders to his subordinate commanders. 103
At 0445, 12 December, Pz.Rgt.15 reported that it was on the move for the
attack. 104 The attacks were bloody and costly; the first Battalion of Pz.G.Rgt.110
lost two of its company commanders. 105 Fighting was fierce, especially around
Nizhna Kalinovski. At 1040, the division sent this cryptic message to Pz.Rgt.15:
"Attack immediately." 106 Other, equally terse messages are registered in the
records, such as: "fga-fga-fga" (feind greift an—enemy is attacking) and "[Enemy]
tanks in the village". At 1400 stragglers were reporting 19 Red tanks in
Surovikino. 107 The line appeared to be faltering. The Russians were making a
103Kriegstagebucri , 1 1 Dec 42.
104Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frame 341.
105Kriegstagebuch. 12 Dec 42.
106Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frame 362.
107Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frames 379, 382, 383.
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major effort to force a bridgehead at Surovikino by a flanking attack on Lissinski,
aiming for Sovchos 79, and from Nizhna Kalinovski eastward. 108
In the war diary, 11th Pz. Div. reported that in its area of operation, the
situation improved markedly through especially mobile, swift, and violent actions
of small combat teams. For instance, three tanks were sent to bolster up Kampf-
gruppe Selle, an Alarmeinheit holding the line at Surovikino. The tanks had a very
positive effect on the defense in that area. 109
That evening, a corps teletype message called for an attack, with the pri-
mary goal of regaining control of the western bank of the Chir, so that the infantry
could reestablish its position. 110 The 1 1th Pz. Div. saw its mission for the next day
to be to finally clean up the situation at Surovikino and Kalinovski, thus setting up
an attack on Ostrovski for the following day. 111 Orders to that effect went out to
the various units of the division. Copies of these orders are in the records.
Not surprisingly, the quality of the 1 1th Pz. Div.'s operations diary starts
to suffer as this grueling tempo of battle continued. Entries on the 7th of Decem-
ber, the first day of action for the division at the Chir river, tend to be more exact,
often listing the time that the action occurred. Contrast this with the log for the
1 lth of December. These entries appear to be more a recapitulation of the day's
activities. They are less precise in stating the exact time of each action, nor does the
log now present a record of each event as it occurred, but rather a summary of the
108Kriegstagebuch . 12 Dec 42.
109Kriegstagebuch . 12 Dec 42. The three tanks were a tank company. See Kriegstagebuch
Anlegband Nr. 2 . frames 414-415, daily summary (Jagesmeldung) of 12 December 1942 from the
11th Pz. Div. to XXXXVIII Pz. Corps.
11 Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frames 400-403.
niKriegstagebuch . 12 Dec 42.
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actions. Still, these logs are generally of excellent quality, especially when consid-
ering the extreme conditions under which they were written.
4. Analysis
During this period of heavy and almost continuous fighting, the 11th
Pz.Div. established a routine, of sorts. The commander spent the day on the battle-
field. In the evening, after conferring with his operations officer, he made his de-
cisions for the following day. Balck then visited all his lower commanders and
personally gave the orders for the next day. In this way, his subordinates could be-
gin to plan for the next day, although they knew that these orders had not yet been
discussed with the Corps, and were therefore subject to change.
Balck seems to have had a very good "track record" of calling the right
plays. Usually, his plans were approved. This in itself is indicative of the command
and control style used by the Heer. Generalmajor Balck was closer to the action
than was the Corps commander and thus had a better feel of the situation. Of
course, he was not aware of the larger picture to the degree that the Corps com-
mander was. But close contact between the command posts at the two HQ mini-
mized the discrepancy. Balck's la, in turn, kept him informed of the situation as he
learned it from the higher command.
The command and control process, then, worked in this way. The com-
mand post, under the la, kept abreast of the location and status of the division's
units, as well as staying in close contact with higher headquarters. The information
coming into the command post was digested by the operations officer and used to
coordinate the battle. The commander would stay on the battlefield where he could
see and feel the actual situation. The operations officer briefed the commander on
the current situation within his division as well as the larger picture based on his
contact with the Corps headquarters. This allowed the commander to compare the
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information about his unit as he experienced it on the ground with that reported to
him by his la. In this way discrepancies could be identified and resolved; reality
could be separated from fiction. This went a long way to reducing the fog of war.
The division commander was also informed of the Corps situation, in particularly
the Corps commander's intent. Having been in the battle lines, the division com-
mander knew the state of his units and the actual situation of his division from his
own experience. By keeping up with the overall situation through his operations
officer, he could usually anticipate the next move. He also was an extremely im-
portant asset to the Corps commander, who could count on him to have a very real-
istic picture of the battle and the capabilities of his troops. Thus, the Corps com-
mander would place great weight on the Division commander's proposals, and
usually accept them if they were in line with the Corps orders and intent.
The tanks worked as the "fire brigade" of the Corps, racing from one end
of the Corps sector to the other, combating Soviet units which had managed to
break through the line. Since relatively little fighting occurred at night, the enemy
situation at dusk tended to be about the same the following morning. 112 The Ger-
mans could analyze the situation that evening and then move through the night, to
be at the right place the following morning.
This kind of situation could be faced by NATO troops in the next war.
Local breakthroughs by Warsaw Pact forces would require NATO's most mobile
units to cover a large sector, racing back and forth to destroy local successes. At-
tack helicopters will play a significant role in this type of warfare. The command
112Attacks started around 0500, at least two hours before sunrise at this latitude and time of
year. This way the German units grabbed the initiative form the Red Army, which normally did not
attack until an hour or so later.
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and control techniques used so effectively by Generalmajor Balck's 11th Panzer
Division provide a successful model.
G. 18 - 19 DECEMBER
1. General Overview
Starting on the 15th of December, the 1 1th Pz.Div. was pulled out of the
fight long enough to regroup in preparation for the next action: to take the bridge
across the Don river at Verchne Chirski. As long as that bridge was in Soviet
hands, it threatened the flank of Generaloberst Hoth's 4th Panzer Army's relief op-
eration heading for Stalingrad. The top priority of Army Group Don, of which the
11th Panzer Division was a part, was still to save Generaloberst Paulus's Sixth
Army. The 16th and 17th of December were days of relative rest for the division.
The attack was planned for the early morning of the 18th. But in a pattern reminis-
cent of the preempted attack to support the relief of Stalingrad on the 7th of De-
cember, this attack likewise was cancelled shortly before it was to begin. The ma-
jor attacks by the Soviets along the Chir river between Surovikino and Lissinski
showed that the Russians were not turning east across the Don to attack the flank of
Hoth's 4th Panzer Army. The plan to capture the bridge across the Don was there-
fore not as important and the 1 1th Pz.Div. could be diverted to counter these enemy
attacks. 113
The 1 1th Pz.Div. turned back towards the battlefields it had just left. The
division took on the task of countering the Soviet attacks across the Chir at
113MeUenthin, 181.
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Ostrovski and Lissinski. An even more serious breakthrough at Nizhna Kalinovski
late on the 18th of December forced the division to revert to its "fire brigade" role.
Figure 3. 1 1th Panzer Division Counterattack Along Chir River 18-19 Dec 1942
2. First Hand Accounts
a. Generalmajor Hermann Balck
As the Division was cleaning up a deep Russian penetration [at Ostrovski and
Lissinski] by swiftly counterattacking, the Corps ordered: "Stop attack. Deep
penetration by Russians 20km further to the west [at Nizhna Kalinovski]." This was
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in the evening and had become standard, so I [Balck] answered Mellenthin
[XXXXVIDth Pz. Corps chief of staff]: "Fine, we'll clean up here first and then deal
with the next problem." "No Sir, General, this time it's more than ticklish, the 11th
Pz.Div. must move immediately, every second is valuable." "All right. Can do." 114
Balck goes on to describe the action. The attack currently under way
was stopped, the vehicles were refueled and the troops fed, and then they dragged
themselves 20km through the dark night. Units were in position at 0500 the next
morning, 19 December, just in time to meet the Russians. The enemy vehicles were
not deployed for battle, but in a convoy. They had not noticed the Germans and
Oberst Graf Schimmelmann, commanding Pz.Rgt.15, held back his attack and
permitted the Russians to continue. He sent a group of tanks to fall in behind the
Soviets. The Russians did not realize that the tanks behind them were not their own.
At the opportune time, the tanks of Pz.Rgt.15 destroyed 42 Russian tanks without
taking a single casualty. 115
These same 25 German Panzers then turned and met the second wave
of enemy tanks. As the Red unit crested a height, momentarily exposing the soft
belly of its tanks, Pz.Rgt.15 fired its guns, yielding 23 more Soviet tanks destroyed,
for a total of 65, without taking a single loss. The accompanying infantry fled,
their tanks were in flames. Another Russian Corps had ceased to exist. 116
Balck was in the area and he took the opportunity to congratulate his
soldiers. "A short while later [after the battle], among the still burning enemy
114Balck, 403. "Als die Division im ziigigen Angriff einen tiefen russischen Einbruch berein-
igte, Befehl des Korps: Angriff abbrechen. Russe 20 km weiter westlich tief durch. Das war
abends das iibliche und ich antwortete Mellenthin: Schon, wir bereinigen erst hier und dann kommt
das andere dran. Nein, Herr General, diesmal ist's mehr als heikel, die 11. Pz. Div. muB sofort




tanks, I was able to thank these brave chaps. The stress of the last days was wiped
away. Smiling faces appeared in the cupolas. This unit was truly unbeatable." 117
b. Oberst i. G. von Mellenthin
The chief of staff of the XXXXVIIIth Pz. Corps describes these
events somewhat differently. According to von Mellenthin,General der
Panzertruppe von Knobelsdorff, the Corps Commander, decided to send the 1 1th
Pz.Div. to counter the Soviet breakthrough immediately, over a protesting Balck,
who wanted to finish the battle he was currently fighting prior to moving west. 118
Still, von Mellenthin gives Generalmajor Balck credit for choosing to "set off
immediately, march through the night, and fall on the enemy at dawn, at the very
moment when the Russians would be preparing to move." 119
By 0500 on 19 December all preliminary moves had been carried out. ...the twenty-
five tanks remaining to the regiment followed the Russian armor and in a few minutes
had knocked out forty-two Russian tanks, before the latter realized that the tanks
moving behind them as a second wave were German and not their own. ...On the other
side of this height another line of tanks was seen moving in a similar way to the first
one. Once again the German tanks. ..attacked the Russians from behind and destroyed
them before they had time to realize what was happening. (Literally a case of being
kicked in the pants!). Thus twenty-five German tanks destroyed sixty-five Russian
tanks in the shortest possible time and without any loss to themselves. 120
117 Ibid., 405. "Wenig spater, noch mitten unter den brennenden Feindpanzem, konnte ich
den tapferen Kerlen danken. Verwischt die Strapazen der letzten Tage. Frohe Gesichter sahen aus





3. Original Source Materials
a. 18 December
Although much happened on the 18th of December, the 11th
Pz.Div.'s operations section's log book has less than a page of entries, as opposed to
the normal three or so pages on a busy day. One reason may be that the fatigue of
the long days of fighting was starting to impact on the staff. Although the division's
fighting units had days of comparative rest on the 16th and 17th, this may not have
slowed down the actions at the operations section, where planning for the now
aborted offensive to take the Don river bridge was in progress. Further, the divi-
sion command post repositioned on the morning of the 18th, to Verchne
Solonovski. 121
At 1600 on the 17th of December, a telephone call from the Corps
HQ alerted the division that the attack of the Don river bridge was cancelled. 122 A
liaison officer from the 336th Infantry Division reported to the command post of
the 1 1th Pz.Div. by 1900, providing information about the current enemy situation.
The adjutants of the various units of the 11th Panzer, which had reported to the
division command post, were briefed on the situation and received the order for the
counterattack. 123 The written order from the XXXXVIIIth Pz. Corps was sent by
teletype and received by the division command post at 2300 on the 17th of De-
cember. 124 Here is an example of the way orders were passed quickly between
121 Kriegstagebuch . 18 Dec 42.
122Kriegstagebuch . 17 Dec 42.
123Kriegstagebuch . 17 Dec 42.
124National Archives Microfilm Publication T315, Records of German Field Commands: Di-
visions, Kriegstagebuch Nr.6 der 11. Panzer Div.Fuhrungs-Abtlg .. Einsatz RuBland . Anlageband
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units. Even from the Corps to the Division headquarters, an important order
would be passed initially by the fastest means available, usually telephone, and then
followed up in writing later on.
Pz.Rgt.15 started to move at 0200 on the 18th of December. 125
Within two hours (at 0350) the tank regiment reported serious problems with icy
roads. "Lots of tanks dropping out of road march. They are sliding off the road
due to the icy conditions. Ten tanks lost up to now." 126 Later that morning
Pz.Rgt.15 told the division that it would not reach its assigned position before
1000. 127 The loss, even temporarily, of ten tanks, was quite serious. In a status re-
port to XXXXVIIIth Pz. Corps on 16 December, the 11th Pz.Div. reported a total
of 83 tanks on hand, of which 47 were mission ready, 21 required limited repairs,
and 15 required extensive repairs. 128
At 1425 the Corps ordered a halt to the counterattack. The division
was to be disengaged from battle and collected at Sovchos 79. 129 At 1550 a radio
Nr. 3 v. 16.12. 1942 - 25. 12. 1942 . roll 595, frames 605 - 606. Hereafter citations from this
source will appear as
"
Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3" followed by the frame number.
125Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 612.
126Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 621. "Sehr grosse Marschausfalle von Panzem
durch Abrutschen durch Glatteis. Bisher 10 Panzer."
127Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 614. Note that this message was filed in front of
the message cited above, although chronologically it follows this message by six hours. The reason
is that the messages were filed as they were initialed by the la, Major Kienitz. The 0905 message
was sent out by the regiment at 0905, received by the division at 0912, and initialed by the la at
0924. The 0350 message was sent out at 0350, received at 0355, but not initialed by the operations
officer until 1040 ! Apparently, an error by the command post personnel kept this important first
message about the poor road conditions from reaching the division operations officer in a timely
manner.
128Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frames 590-591. The authorized strength of the 1 1th
Panzer Division was 99 tanks. The division had only 2 of its authorized 3 tank battalions, the 3rd
Battalion of Pz.Rgt.15 remained with Army Group Center in Roslavl. A Panzer Division with its
full complement of tank battalions was authorized 150 tanks.
129Kriegstagebuch . 18 Dec 42.
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message was sent to Pz.G.Rgt.l 10, ordering a halt to the attack, further orders to
follow. 130
In its daily activity report, as of 1826, 18 December, the 1 1th Pz.Div.
reported, among other items, that "the enemy was not very active. Value of
Russian infantry is marginal. Heavy Russian bomber and close air support activity.
No support from own Luftwaffe." 131 The same report gave a mission ready count
for tanks as 29, down from 47 reported on the 16th. 132 Most, if not all, of these
losses were temporary, inflicted by the icy road conditions.
b. 19 December
The written order from Corps, instructing the divison to assemble at
Sovchos 79, was sent out at 1900 on 18 December, by teletype. The attack was to
start at 0500 the next morning, 19 December. The entire corps artillery was sub-
ordinated to the 1 1th Pz.Div. for this attack. 133 Spot reports started to arrive at the
division command post at 0637, when Pz.Rgt.15 reported an enemy convoy with
tanks. 134 At 0650, Pz.G.Rgt.l 10 reported a strong enemy of 50 tanks, infantry, and
artillery, forming up to move south. 135 By 0710, Pz.G.Rgt.l 10 was engaged in
130Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 633.
131 Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 642. "Feind wenig activ. Kampfwert der russ.
Infanterie gering. Starkere russ. Bomben- und Schlachtfliegertatigkeit. Keine Unterstiitzung durch
eigene Luftwaffe."
132Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 642.
133Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 646-647.
134Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 661.
135Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 664. This message is interesting also in that it
gives the time of the sighting as 0630, the time of its transmission as 0640, and the time of receipt at
division as 0650. Thus, this spot report took 20 minutes to travel from the unit in the field to the
divisional command post.
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battle with enemy tanks. 136 By 0715, Pz.Rgt.15 had also spotted 24 enemy tanks
moving south. 137 A spot report from Pz.Art.Regt.l 19, the division's artillery
regiment, noted 24 enemy tanks, and 2 - 3 enemy battalions moving south.
Pz.Art.Rgt.119 reported a serious shortage of ammunition at 0735,
19 December. "At battalion RICHTER serious munitions shortage, due to no
ammo trucks. Urgent resupply by convoy requested."138 Half an hour later, at
0805, the artillery regiment reported only 30 minutes of ammunition left. 139
By 0750, the second battalion of Pz.Rgt.15 had engaged enemy tanks
from the rear. Several enemy tanks were reported destroyed, but no count was
given at this time. 140 Shortly thereafter, at 0842, the first indication of a major
victory is received at the division command post. The panzer regiment reported
that "over half of the enemy tanks destroyed. No friendly losses." 141 Then, at
0859, more precise information arrived at the division: "25 enemy tanks destroyed.
2 friendly tanks lightly damaged." 142
In the early afternoon (1315), enemy tanks attacked Pz.G.Rgt.110.
Pz.Rgt.15 informed the division that its second battalion, the same one that attacked
136Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 669.
137Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frame 670.
138Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 674. "Bei Abt. RICHTER grosser Muni-
Mangel, da keine Muni-Wagen. Eilige Zufuhrung durch Kolonne erbeten."
139Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 677.
140Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 675. "II/Pz.15 hat mit vordersten Teilen feindl.
Panzer erreicht bei 148,8 von hinten. Einzelne vemichtete Panzer z. Zl gemeldet."
141 Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 683. "Uber die Halfte der Feindpanzer ver-
nichtet. Kein eigener Ausfall."
142Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 688.
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the enemy's rear earlier that day, was moving to counterattack. Almost simultane-
ously, at 1325, Pz.G.Rgt.l 10 radioed the command post that it was in serious trou-
ble. "Our position. ..overrun by 15 enemy tanks. The 8.8cm FLAK out of action.
Enemy is attacking to the south and east."143 At the same time (1310) the artillery
regiment was also attacked by about 10 tanks, and reported close combat
("Nahkampf). By 1350 the first encouraging message was dispatched by
Pz.Rgt.15: "Enemy tanks destroyed. Count not yet clear." 144 An hour later (1425),
Pz.G.Rgt.l 10, which had a battalion overrun, reported that the enemy tanks behind
its lines had been brought to a halt. 145
After the fighting was completed, more accurate messages started to
filter into the division command post. At 1725 Pz.G.Rgt.l 10 reported that its at-
tached FLAK had destroyed 7 tanks. Own casualties had not been tallied. 146 In its
daily activity report to the XXXXVIIIth Panzer Corps, the 11th Panzer Division
reported having destroyed 48 enemy tanks, not counting the 7 that were scored by
the attached FLAK. Its own strength was given as 23 tanks, down from the 29 re-
ported a say earlier. 147
The operations log for the 19th consists of a two-paragraph recapit-
ulation of the events of the day. Items are not recorded in chronological order as
143Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 705. "Eigene Stellung...von 15 fdl. Panzem ist
iiberschritten. 8,8cm Flak ausgefallen. Feind in einem (?) Angriff nach Sud und Ost."
144Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 707. "Feindliche Panzer vemichtet. Anzahl
noch unklar."
145Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 32 . frame 708.
146Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 32 . frame 712. Two FLAK weapons (probably 88mm)
were assigned to the regiment from Gruppe v. Stumpfeld, one of the Alarmeinheiten. See
Kriegstagebuch Anlegband Nr. 2 . frame 713.
147Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frames 713-714.
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they occur, as was standard practice. The last quarter of the entry boasts of the
outstanding performance of the division during the last 10 days:
The enemy's plan was made impossible through the actions of the division, which
was thrown, fast as lightning, from east to west and back again, always striking
blows of annihilation. Correct interpretation of the situation and immediate actions by
the Division Commander led the division to this unique victory, in which 2 -3 Tank
Corps and 1 motorized-mechanized Corps were exterminated within 10 days. The di-
vision is convinced that it played the major role in one of the greatest defensive victo-
ries of the Eastern Campaign. By crushing the strongest elements of the Russian 5th
Tank Army, the division has also played a decisive part in the success of the opera-
tions to relieve Stalingrad. 148
Whether this kind of diatribe belongs in the operations log is debat-
able. However, it provides valuable insight into how the division perceived its per-
formance and its part in the overall operations.
An item which has absolutely nothing to do with the battle at hand was
also preserved in the records. A secret letter from the Corps HQ informed the
division of the upcoming issue of snow plows, and instructed the division to send
soldiers to a course being set up for training operators for this equipment. The
message was written and received on the 19th of December, the same day in which
the heavy fighting described above was going on. The letter is signed by the chief
of staff of the XXXXVIIIth Pz. Corps, Oberst i. G. von Mellenthin. As always,
Major Kienitz, the division la, initialed the correspondence, indicating that he had
seen it. The word "Eilf\ meaning "urgent" is hand written on the letter, probably
148Kriegstagebuch . 19 Dec 42. "Dieses Verhaben ist dem Gegner durch die Einsatze der Di-
vision, die blitzanig wahrend der Nachte von Osten nach Westen und zuriick geworfen wurde, und
inn immer wieder vernichtend schlug, unmOglich gemacht worden. Richtiges Erkennen der Lage
und blitzartiges Handeln des Div.-Kdr. hat die Division zu diesem einzigartigen Erfolg innerhalb 10
Tagen 2 - 3 Panzer-Korps und 1 mot.-mech.Korps zu vemichten, gefuhrt. Die Division ist davon
iiberzeugt, da6 sie groBten Anteil an einem der glanzendsten Abwehrerfolge des Ostfeldzuges hat.
Durch die Zertriimmerung der starksten Teile der russ. 5. Panzer-Armee hat die Division auch
entscheiden Anteil an dem Gesamt-Erfolg der Operationen zur Entsetzung von Stalingrad."
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by Kienitz. 149 A radio call instructs the division's engineer company (Panzer-Pio-
nier Kompanie 209) to identify one Non-commissioned officer and nine men for
immediate use as snowplow operators. 150
4. Analysis
Reminiscent of the action which marked the start of the Chir river battles
on the 7th of December, another major attack (this one to capture the Don river
bridge) was cancelled only a few hours before it was to start. The 1 1th Pz.Div. re-
turned to its "fire brigade" mission. Then, while putting out one "fire" at Ostrovski
and Lissinski, a bigger blaze 20 km west demanded its immediate attention. The
situation was chaotic.
Some cracks were starting to show in the functioning of the command
post. Both the relatively poor quality of the operations log and the bungled hand-
ling of the initial message concerning the icy road conditions indicate that things
were not running smoothly. Given the long days of almost continuous combat and
the near chaotic situation at the front, it is a wonder that the command post func-
tioned as well as it did. That even items unrelated to combat were not ignored is
demonstrated by the snow plow action.
Providing subordinate units early warning of a change in mission was an
important control technique. Even between Corps and Division HQ, a telephonic
order was sufficient to get the mission going; the written copy would follow in due
course. The important thing was timeliness. Command and control actions were
not slaves to inflexible procedures.
149Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frames 725-726.
150Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 722.
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The second battalion, Panzer Regiment 15, annihilated a large portion of
an entire Red Army Tank Corps. This battle was not constricted by phase lines
drawn by a staff officer removed from the actual battlefield. The commander saw
a unique opportunity and supported by his confidence in himself and his soldiers, he
rose to the occasion. He also had confidence in his superiors, that they would sup-
port his unorthodox decision to fall in behind the Russian tanks. This attitude stems
from the education of the officers, especially the fostering of initiative. That atti-
tude was also advanced by the German sense of superiority over the Russians. The
order that the tank regiment received did not specify exactly when, where, or how
the enemy was to be fought. These concepts are the cornerstones of Auftragstaktik.
It is important to recall that Generalmajor Balck made it a point to be located on the
battlefield at the crux, so it is quite possible that he was there along with Oberst
Graf Schimmelmann, the regimental commander, when Hauptmann Lestmann, the
battalion commander, maneuvered his tanks behind those of the Soviets.
A further indication of the initiative displayed by the subordinate com-
manders was this message sent from Pz.Rgt.15 to the division command post:
"Enemy tanks attacking [Pz.G.Rgt.] 1 10. 11/15 [2nd Bn, Pz.Rgt.15] on the move to
counterattack. 151 The division did not tell the tanks to go support the mechanized
infantry regiment. The subordinate commander saw the problem and made a deci-
sion. His guidance was the commander's intent, not a choreographed battle plan.
This is how Generalmajor Balck created order out of this chaos and led his tank di-
vision to a spectacular victory.





Whereas the Chir River battles are relatively well discussed in both English and
German secondary sources, the actions of the 1 1th Panzer Division immediately af-
ter the Chir River have received little coverage. Yet this battle is important in that
it demonstrates what a well led unit is capable of under extreme conditions of fa-
tigue (both among the soldiers and the equipment) and weather.
As the Russian pressure along the Chir River waned momentarily, the
1 lth Panzer Division was relieved in place by the 336th Infantry Division. Once
again, the 1 lth was to perform duties as a fire brigade, though this time not ini-
tially under the XXXXVIIIth Panzer Corps, but under the command of the 3rd
Rumanian Army. Ninety miles west of the Chir River battlefield, the Red Army
was moving towards Rostov, threatening that vital transportation center. 152
Generalmajor Balck received the task to salvage the situation.
B. FIRST HAND ACCOUNT
Generalmajor von Mellenthin provides only a very short mention of this battle.
The 1 lth Panzer Division was returned to that Corps after being assigned to the 3rd
Rumanian Army for only 2 days. Actually, the XXXXVIIIth Panzer Corps fol-
lowed the 1 lth Panzer Division westward.
General der Panzertruppe Balck devotes about four pages of his autobiography
to this battle. He was desperate:
152von Mellenthin, 202-3.
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The situation was hopeless. The only hope was my tired and battle-wom Division,
which arrived [in the area] piece by piece. I was of the view that the situation was so
grave, that it could be salvaged only through audacity, that is, by attacking. Any de-
fensive action meant our destruction. 153
Balck moved his units towards Skassyrskaya to block the Red Army move
south to Rostov. He moved forward with only twenty tanks. The rest of the divi-
sion was still en route from the Chir River area. But the Russians were no longer at
Skassyrskaya and had moved further south towards Tatsinskaya, so that he was in
the Russians' rear. Balck immediately ordered, via radio, for the rest of his units to
deploy concentrically around Tatsinskaya as they came up. Soon the commander of
the Russian XXIVth Corps ordered all his tanks to concentrate on his position, as
there were enemy tanks to his rear. This message was transmitted without encryp-
tion and was monitored by Balck. A reenactment of Cannae was in the making.
The following day, Christmas Day 1942, the division closed the ring around
Tatsinskaya, but was unsuccessful in forcing a collapse of the Russian Corps
trapped in its vise. The 26th was a day of frustration. Nothing seemed to click.
Only 8 functioning tanks were now available to the Division. Reinforcements be-
came lost en route and wasted the entire day. An attack from all sides on the 27th
squeezed the Russians into a much tighter pocket, but their resistance was still
formidable. That day a Russian plane landed near Balck's command post. When he
realized his mistake and attempted to take off again, he was shot down. Apparently
the plane was to go to the Russian command post, which had been located at the
same spot two days earlier. 154
153Balck, 408. "Die Lage verzweifelt. Die einzige Hoffhung - meine mude und abgekampfte
Division, die tropfenweise herankam. Ich vertrat scharf die Auffassung, daB sie nur noch durch
Kiihnheit, d. h. Angriff, zu meistem sei. Jede defensive Losung bedeutet Vemichtung."
154Balck, 411.
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On the 28th the pocket burst. 12 tanks and 30 trucks managed to escape. The
rest was destroyed. We chased down those vehicles which had escaped and de-
stroyed them also. "This was the end of the XXIVth Panzer Corps. All this had
been accomplished with a tired division, starting with 20 tanks, which was reduced
to 8 - 12 tanks. We had very few casualties."155
The troops were magnificent. Despite unheard of hardships outstanding morale. The
huge food caches which fell into our hands in Tatsinskaya, and from which every sol-
dier received a large share, had its desired effect. When I drove by, chocolates,
cigarettes, and sausages were thrown into the car: "The general must have some,
too." 156
"The division had the singular luck to fight a successful Cannae without assis-
tance against an enemy twice our strength. Their leader was another Terrentius
Varro, who played right along."157
C. ORIGINAL SOURCE MATERIAL
A cryptic radio message received at midnight 22 - 23 December ordered the
division to detach itself from the front and work for the 3rd Rumanian Army to de-
fend Morovskaya. At 0445 on the 23rd the division command post received the or-
der per hard copy teletype. 158 The new mission once more required the division to
155 Ibid.
156Ibid. "Die Leute waren Glanzend. Trotz unerhbrter Strapazen hervorragende Stimmung.
Namentlich die phantastischen Verpflegungslager in Tatschinskaja, in denen sich jeder reichlich
versehen konnte, taten das ihre. Wo ich vorbeifuhr, flog Schokolade, Zigaretten, Hartwurst in
meinen Wagen. 'Herr General miissen auch was haben."'
157Ibid., 412. "Hat die Division doch das seltene Gluck gehabt, vollig aus eigenem Tun ein
siegreiches Cannae gegen einen doppelt uberlegenen Feind zu schlagen. Es fuhrte gegenuber
allerdings auch ein Terrentius Varro, der brav mitspielte."
158Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frames 870, 875.
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to act as a fire brigade. That afternoon (1335 hours) the la, Major Kienitz, passed
along Balck's decision that the Division will start to march at night again. 159
There was no accurate intelligence on the enemy's location. No one knew
exactly where to find the Russians, so the combat battalions went forward to find
them. A secret letter from the Ic (Intelligence Officer) to the regiments and sepa-
rate battalions on the 26th of December stated that the enemy situation was "totally
unknown" and reinforced the need to send prisoners and captured documents to the
intelligence officer quickly. 160
The first portions of the division arrived at the new assembly area shortly after
midnight 23 to 24 December. Pz.Rgt.15 had 22 tanks, the only working tanks left
to the division. Throughout the night the tired soldiers move on. The movement of
IVth Battalion, 1 19th Artillery Regiment, fell apart at 0200 due to the icy roads. A
battery had to be left behind while the rest of the battalion continued on. 161
Later that morning the first enemy contacts were reported by Pz.Rgt.15 near
Skassyrskaya. Within two hours the town was cleared of enemy and an undamaged
bridge across the Kalitva River was under German control. Balck's statement that
there was no enemy at Skassyrskaya contradicts the original sources, but the enemy
presence was slight. Pz.Rgt.15 reported sighting only four tanks. 162
159Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 888.
160National Archives Microfilm Publication T315, Records of German Field Commands:
Divisions, Tatigkeitsbericht mit Kartenanlagen. vom 1.11- 31.12.42. der 11. Panzer-Div. Abt.Ic.
zumKTB.Nr.6der Abt. la. roll 596, frame 174.
161 Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 917.
162Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3. frames 935, 944, 950.
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By early afternoon the spearhead of the 11th Panzer Division was in heavy
contact on its way to Tatsinskaya. At 1340 Pz.Rgt.15 reported fighting 15 enemy
tanks vicinity hill 175. 163 This is the hill where the Russian Corps Commander as-
sembled his entire force and which became the center of the cauldron in which his
Corps was destroyed. The Panzer Regiment had 20 Mark III, 3 Mark IV, and 3
command tanks (Befehlspanzer ) involved in the fight. They destroyed 5 enemy
tanks, but lost 4 Mark Ills. Whether the German tanks were destroyed or lost to
mechanical problems is not clear. 164
This was Christmas eve. Although the division was in the thick of battle, Balck
found the opportunity so send a solemn message to his soldiers, although it was by
radio. "The Division reflects on this holy night on its brave soldiers." 165
Later that evening (21 10) Russian forces attacked the bridgehead set up across
the Kalitva, but they were unsuccessful. Gruppe Lestmann was ordered to come to
the aid of the bridgehead. The battle raged until at least midnight. 166
During the next two days, 25 and 26 December 1942, the rest of the division
closed the ring around the XXIVth Russian Tank Corps. Although there was a
good deal of fighting, Balck was unable to break the defenses of the encircled Rus-
sians. At 1300 on 25 December, the 11th Panzer Division was placed back under
the XXXXVIIIth Panzer Corps, which had by now also moved west from the Chir
River battlefield. By 1445, 25 December, Pz.Rgt.15 had only 9 tanks operational.
163Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3. frame 966.
164Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frames 986-7.
165Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 991. "Die Div gedenkt Heiligen Abend ihrer
tapferen Truppen."
166Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3. frames 998, 1000-1003.
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The division kept the Russians in the cauldron, but with this little firepower, it was
unable to break through their defenses. 167 The soldiers, like their equipment, were
at the end of their abilities. P.G.Rgt.lll reported that frostbite was becoming a
problem, due to lethargy caused by extreme fatigue. 168
On 28 December the battle finally became decisive. The 4th Panzergrenadier
Regiment had been placed under the operational control of 1 1th Panzer Division.
Early on the 28th, the Russian Tank Corps attacked to break out of the encirclement
to the northwest, along the sector assigned to P.G.Rgt.4. A radio report to the Di-
vision command post at 0125 first notified the command of the Russian move. 169 A
portion of the Russian forces succeeded in breaking through. On command of the
la the escaped forces were pursued and destroyed. Generalmajor Balck was not
available to make a decision, so the operations officer took the initiative to order
the pursuit. 170
D. ANALYSIS
The 11th Panzer Division had been running back and forth across the entire
Chir River battlefield prior to this battle. Just as this battle was slowing down, the
division was moved ninety miles to continue to perform "fire brigade" duties. The
troops and the equipment must have been extremely exhausted. The lack of tanks
indicates the anemic status of the division. Balck was able to drive his weary
167Krie gstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3. frames 1021, 1031, 1064, 1073, 1079, 1080.
168Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 3 . frame 1088. "Zahlreiche Erfrierungserscheinungen
infolge Abstumpfung durch Ubermiidung." The temperatures during these days was between
minus 9 and minus 24 degrees Celsius (plus 16 to minus 11 degrees Fahrenheit). Daily
temperatures are recorded in the Kriegstagebuch .
169Kriegstagebuch Anlageband Nr. 4 . frame 1318.
170Kriegstagebuch . 28 Dec 42.
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soldiers to reenact Cannae during Christmas on the frozen Ukrainian steppe. This
accomplishment underlines Balck's abilities as a commander.
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V. CONCLUSION
Weapons systems are becoming more and more complex. These systems are so
much more mobile and lethal that the resulting battlefield can easily become even
more chaotic than it has been in the past. The great strides in electronic communi-
cations and data processing offer the opportunity to reduce or to magnify the chaos.
The last forty years have brought a revolution in technology, but a concrete philos-
ophy of command and control has not been developed to use this new technology to
restore order to the chaos of the next battle. Auftragstaktik promises to be a con-
cept which may provide a foundation for such a philosophy. In any case, continued
study of this concept cannot be a mistake. The brilliant tactical and operational suc-
cesses at the hands of the German Army of World War II provide ample proof of
this concept in batde.
This analysis of the 1 1th Panzer Division at the Chir river battles focused on
the command and control actions, as opposed to a study of tactics. This thesis did
not intend to provide a full description of the battle, blow by blow, although some
events are studied in greater depth than others. Rather, representative actions were
presented which give insight into command and control issues. The major source
for the detailed information was the division operations log, and its supporting
documents. These references cannot give a complete picture of how the division
solved its command and control problems. But from these papers a rough sketch of
Auftragstaktik in action was drawn.
The analysis of the first day of batde, 7 December, showed the speed with
which a totally unexpected order, contrary to the planned attack, was transmitted
from XXXXVIIIth Corps, to 11th Panzer Division, then to Panzer Regiment 15.
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From the time the Corps warning order was received at the division command post
until the first battalion of Pz.Rgt.15 started to move was only 30 minutes. There
was no time for details; these were worked out as the tanks moved closer to where
they were needed. This day also provided a glimpse of the interaction between the
division commander and the corps staff. Having spent much of his time on the
ground with his soldiers, Generalmajor Balck had first hand knowledge of the ter-
rain and could argue effectively against the initial Corps order. According to the
concepts of Auftragstaktik, the Corps order should not have specified from what
direction Balck was to attack the enemy. Finally, this day demonstrated another
important concept; that of trust in the fellow officer. When a junior officer at the
division command post called the Panzer Regiment with the unexpected order, it
was acted on immediately.
The fighting on the following day, 8 December, illustrates further possibilities
of the German manner of combat. Here Balck displayed his command style; taking
the initiative away from the enemy. He did this by moving at night and surprising
the Soviets. The German sense of superiority and its counterpart, the Soviet sense
of inferiority, played a major role. Also noted was the brevity of the communica-
tions. From these short messages one feels the sense of urgency as well as the lack
of a large staff to debate issues and devise long-winded ways of saying simple
things.
The following section, covering the period 9-17 December, looked at the
routine between the division commander and his command post. The senior divi-
sion staff officer, the la, was a major. He was not only the operations officer, but
also the chief-of-staff. There were no assistant division commanders. Here again,
the small size of the division staff relative to today's staff is presented. This is true
not only in the number of soldiers assigned to the staff, but also in the seniority of
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these officers. The la served as both the orchestrator of the division's forces when
a change had to be made, and as the division's contact with the higher headquarters.
He was the focal point for all information coming into the division from outside.
He analyzed this information, as well as the reports from the various divisional el-
ements, and reported his analysis to the commander, keeping him abreast of the
bigger picture. The commander did not spend much time with things outside his
division, relying on his la to tell him what he needed to know.
The next section looked at the major battle of the 18th and 19th of December.
Here the analysis focused on the initiative of the commanders. An important vic-
tory resulted from a battalion commander choosing an unorthodox tactic to de-
stroy over 40 Red Army tanks. The German tank officer knew that he was
expected to show initiative in defeating the enemy. When a rare opportunity pre-
sented itself, he had the confidence to take advantage of it, knowing that this was
precisely what his superiors expected of him. His guidance was the commander's
intent.
The presentation of the Tatsinskaya battle focused not on the command and
control aspects. Rather, it is a tribute to the generalship of Balck. His ability to ex-
ecute a brilliant battle plan under such adverse conditions is worthy of continued
study.
Some of the concepts of Auftragstaktik are quite similar to the command and
control techniques in use in the U.S. Army. The examples of the 1 1th Panzer Divi-
sion brought to mind similar personal experiences that I had had in a tank division
in Europe during major field training exercises. But other components of
Auftragstaktik are foreign to our current force. Today's division and higher staffs
often resemble a three-ring circus. Instead of using the new communications and
data processing technologies to reduce the labor force, more soldiers are required
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to keep the whole thing from collapsing. With more people, internal friction in-
creases and it becomes harder to ensure that the right information gets to the right
person.
The AirLand battle doctrine has established maneuver theory as the basis of
how the U.S. Army fights. The flexibility and mobility inherent in this doctrine
closely resembles the combat style of the German Army of World War II.
Auftragstaktik, their command and control doctrine, deserves continued close
scrutiny as a framework for our own command and control philosophy on the
modern battlefield.
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VI. APPLYING AUFTRAGSTAKTIK TO THE AIRLAND
BATTLE
This short synopsis presents two avenues for establishing a command and con-
trol philosophy based on Auftragstaktik to complement the U. S. Army's revolution
in operational doctrine. The significant strides being achieved under the AirLand
Battle concept cannot reach their full value without a more efficient and effective
style of commanding and controlling the chaos on the battlefield.
Computers can be used to process immense amounts of data. Currently we
have huge staffs to sift through this information so that commanders are not
overwhelmed. We must find a way to use the power of the computer to reduce
staffs and decrease the time the commander needs to make a decision. Our need for
detailed data must be tempered by what we really need to know to arrive at a quick,
good decision, rather than what we would like to know to arrive at a lengthy,
optimum decision. Operational staffs must be small so that information can be
easily shared among a nucleus of officers streamlined enough to advise the
commander in making timely operational decisions.
We must develop a new method of passing orders. The inclusion of the com-
mander's concept in the operations order has been a vital first step in the right
direction. Too often, however, commanders turn this new tool into a lengthy
diatribe on exactly how they envision the battle to be fought. Short, very broad
concepts are needed rather than detailed minutiae. Our operations orders are also
far too detailed. Standard procedures, for example, belong in SOPs and not in
operations orders. The commander must train his staff and subordinate
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commanders so that they don't need lengthy instructions. Involved operations
orders also take too long to write. While staffs are composing, printing,
disseminating, and rewording orders, the enemy situation is constantly changing
making detailed orders obsolete. Quick, broad orders are needed to keep ahead of
the enemy. The subordinate commander most likely is more aware of the combat
situation in his area than the higher staff. Let him decide how to execute the
command of the higher commander.
The present revolution in Army operational doctrine must be carried through.
We have restructured and reequipped our forces to support the AirLand battle
concept. The challenge now is to establish an effective method to command and
control our forces so that we force our opponent to react to our operational
decisions.
The German style of making and executing command decisions under the
conditions of wartime uncertainty, danger, chance, and stress recounted in this
paper serves as a model of the right style . The challenge for the U.S. Army is to
combine the right style with the information processing power of the computer to
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